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The Financing of Benefits in
Unemployment Insurance
Ernest J. Eberling*
The federal-state unemployment insurance system is one of the
nation s most important measures against the privation of unemployment.
The author here examines the problems of financing the benefits and
suggests ways of improving financing, including a proposal for rein-
surance to provide against heavy drains on reserves during recessions.
The current federal-state unemployment insurance system has been
in operation throughout the country for over a quarter of a century.
As one of the two major social insurance programs created by the
Social Security Act of 1935,1 it has become generally accepted as one
of the nation's most important measures against the privation of unem-
ployment and as a stabilizer of the economy in helping offset the
downdrag on economic activity resulting from excessive joblessness.
Despite its general acceptance, however, it has been subjected to
vigorous controversy in recent years. Criticism of the program has
focused largely upon two issues, the financing of benefits and the
extent of the protection afforded the unemployed by the benefit for-
mula. This paper is concerned with the first of these. The two are
closely related, however, since inadequate financing may serve as a
deterrent to adequate benefits.
I. OmGIAL FiNANCING PRoVIsIONs
The revenue for unemployment insurance funds is derived almost
wholly from payroll taxes levied on employers; only Alabama, Alaska,
and New Jersey levy taxes on employees. The Social Security Act set
the tax rate on employers at 3 per cent of the first three thousand
dollars earned by each employee in a year. Any employer could offset
against this tax, however, any amount up to 2.7 per cent of taxable
0 Professor Emeritus of Economics and Business Administration, Vanderbilt Uni-
versity; Director of Research and Statistics, Tennessee Department of Employment
Security.
Professor Eberling was Chairman of the Benefit Financing Committee of the
Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies in 1959 and a member of
the Committee in 1963. He has served as chairman of a number of other national
committees concerned with problems of unemployment insurance and employment
service.
1. Social Security Act §§ 1-1105, 49 Stat. 620 (1935), 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1371
(1959).
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payrolls which he contributed to a state unemployment insurance pro-
gram. Further, if the state had a federally-approved program of ex-
perience rating, he might, for example, be assigned a zero rate because
of low unemployment costs and still receive the full offset credit of
2.7 per cent against his federal tax liability. The remaining 0.3 per
cent of the federal tax was payable directly to the federal government
and became the source of grants to the states to pay all the costs of
administration.
2
It was, of course, the obvious intent of Congress to put pressure on
the states to establish unemployment insurance systems since they
could do so and levy taxes up to 2.7 per cent of taxable payrolls with-
out causing any additional burden on employers. If a state failed to
act, then the full 3 per cent was payable to the federal government.
All of the states acted and the federal-state system became fully
operative by 1937.
Each state became responsible under this system for financing the
benefits payable under its formula, determining the eligibility require-
ments, and the amount and duration of benefits. Hence, each state
had to set up its own formula for benefit payments and provide a tax
schedule which would finance them, including an adequate reserve
fund to maintain the solvency of the program despite the unusually
heavy benefit drains which occur during periods of recession.
All states eventually adopted some form of experience rating which
provided for a differentiated tax rate structure.3 This was based on
the theory that employers with low unemployment costs-few layoffs
-should pay lower tax rates than those with many layoffs and high
unemployment costs. It was assumed that by varying the rate in this
manner, employers would have an incentive to stabilize employment.
The tax schedule in a given state might vary from zero per cent to 2.7
per cent or higher on taxable payrolls. Most of the states had these
variable rate structures in effect by the early 1940's. It was the adop-
tion of experience rating systems, therefore, which made possible the
decline in tax rates which developed early in the program.
II. NATIoNAL TrENDs IN FimANciNG BEFTrrs
There are three series of data which clearly show trends in the
financial experience of the system. These are: (1) benefit cost rates,
2. The Social Security Amendments of 1960 § 523 increased the federal unemploy-
ment tax to 3.1 per cent. 74 Stat. 980 (1960), amending INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §
3301. For tax offset purposes the tax is still 3.0 per cent, hence the effect of this action
was to increase the federal tax on employers to 0.4 per cent. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 3302(d)(1).




(2) year-end reserve ratios, and (3) average tax rates. They are
determined by obtaining the percentage which benefit expenditures,
year-end reserves and tax collections each comprised of the same base-
taxable wages. Since all three are related to the same base, they are
wholly comparable. They are shown by year for the period 1938-1962
for all states combined in Table 1. A careful review of this table re-
veals considerable information about the significant financial trends
which developed over the years in the system and particularly why
concern has grown more recently in respect to the financing of
benefits.
TABLE 14
Benefits, Reserves and Average Employer Contribution Rates,
1938-1962 All States Combined
(2) (3)
Year (1) Reserves as Average
Benefits of Dec. 31 employer
to taxable to taxable tax
wages wages rate
1938 2.18 4.31 2.75
1939 1.59 5.41 2.72
1940 1.72 6.04 2.69
1941 .89 6.53 2.58
1942 .69 6.81 2.19
1943 .13 7.99 2.09
1944 .10 10.01 1.92
1945 .76 11.81 1.71
1946 1.72 10.77 1.43
1947 1.06 10.01 1.41
1948 1.01 9.68 1.24
1949 2.28 9.19 1.31
1950 1.68 8.55 1.50
1951 .93 8.62 1.58
1952 1.05 8.80 1.45
1953 .97 8.95 1.30
1954 2.10 8.51 1.12
1955 1.33 8.14 1.18
1956 1.26 7.81 1.32
1957 1.54 7.68 1.31
1958 3.22 6.37 1.32
1959 1.98 5.98 1.71
1960 2.29 5.57 1.88
1961 2.87 4.86 2.03
1962 2.13 5.00 2.36
4. INTERSTATE CONFERENCE OF EMPLOYMENT~SEcuRnY AcENciES, REPORT OF COM-
MITEE oN BENEFrr FiNANCiNG 6 (Sept. 1959); U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, UNENPLOYMENT
INSURANCE FiNANcIAL DATA, 1938-1962 (rev. ed. 1962).
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It will be noted, for example, that the reserves of the system piled
up at a very rapid rate during the first eight years of experience,
reaching an all-time high when related to taxable wages of 11.81
per cent in 1945. A comparison of column 3 with column 1 shows
why. Although the average tax rates began to decline immediately in
1939 as a result of the combination of experience rating with low
unemployment costs and continued this decline throughout the eight-
year period, they were still much higher than the benefit cost rates
and higher than any time after until the 1960's. This difference be-
tween tax rates and benefit cost rates is especially noticeable during the
war years-1941-45. The average annual benefit cost rate for the
whole eight years (1938-1945) was only 0.75 per cent, while the
average annual tax rate for the same period was 2.41 per cent. This
difference is the source of the rapid accumulation of reserves for the
system through 1945. It was the boom period of World War II with
its rapidly rising employment and payrolls and very low unemploy-
ment levels, coupled with relatively high tax rates which caused the
development of this favorable reserve position.
After 1945, however, the picture changed radically. Reserves fell
steadily in relation to taxable wages, from the peak of 11.81 per cent
at the end of 1945 to an all-time low of 4.86 per cent in 1961. Again
a review of average tax rates and benefits cost rates will show how
this came about. The average tax rate declined from 1.71 per cent
in 1945 to an all-time low of 1.12 per cent for 1954 then rose slowly
in succeeding years to reach a figure of 2.36 per cent in 1962-the
highest rate since 1941. But the significant feature of this period is
that while the tax rate was declining or relatively stable at low levels,
the benefit cost rate was rising, in some years very sharply. In fact,
for 10 of the 17 years following 1946, the benefit cost rate exceeded
the average tax rate. The table above shows also that the greatest
increase in benefit costs occurred during the recession years-1949,
1954, 1958, 1960-61. Further, beginning with 1958 when the benefit
cost rate soared to 3.22 per cent, it has remained about 2 per cent or
higher. To the contrary, the average tax rate did not reach 2.0
per cent until 1961, the first year it had been that high since 1943.
The average benefit cost rate for the whole period 1946-1962 was
1.78 per cent, the average tax rate 1.55 per cent. For the five-year
period 1958-1962 the average benefit cost rate was 1.51 per cent,
the average tax rate 1.15 per cent. Here then is a clear case of under-
financing which became more evident during the last five years of
the period. It is also quite obvious that this underfinancing resulted
in a process of erosion in reserves which has been in progress
throughout the post World War II period, culminating in a drastic
fall in the relative reserve strength of the system as a whole. A
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particularly important feature of this erosion of reserves has been the
severe impact of recession years. The table shows that benefit cost
rates exceeded 2 per cent in 1949, 1954, 1958, 1960-61. These years
of cyclical downturn caused rapid depletion of reserves and greatly
accentuated the effects of underfinancing.
The discussion to this point has been concerned with the financing
record of the system as a whole, using data from all states combined,
hence, it does not point out how the individual states fared.
III. STATE TENDs IN FINACING BENEFITS
It will be recalled, however, that it is the individual states which
have the full responsibility for financing benefits within their respec-
tive jurisdictions. All states with few exceptions followed national
trends and incurred severe shrinkage of reserves after 1945. The
extent of this shrinkage by state for selected years is shown in
Table 2.
TABLE 25
Ratio of Funds Available to Taxable Wages, by State,
at the End of Selected Years
State 1945 1946 1949 1950 1954 1958a 1962
United States 11.8 10.8 9.2 8.6 8.5 6.3 5.0
Alabama 9.2 8.5 6.8 6.4 7.0 5.1 3.6
Alaska 17.5 18.5 11.8 9.3 3.2 2.8b 3.0
Arizona 11.6 11.5 11.3 11.3 11.2 10.1 7.8
Arkansas 10.3 10.7 9.6 8.5 8.7 6.8 4.0
California 15.0 12.9 9.3 8.5 9.1 7.6 4.1
Colorado 11.9 11.6 11.9 11.3 10.9 8.1 4.9
Connecticut 13.4 13.5 10.9 9.9 11.8 8.8 7.0
Delaware 9.5 8.2 6.7 6.0 5.4 2.2 3.0
District of Columbia 13.2 11.0 9.2 9.0 9.9 9.6 8.5
Florida 10.1 9.8 8.8 8.2 6.3 3.8 4.4
Georgia 11.1 10.8 10.3 9.8 9.7 7.8 6.8
Hawaii 11.8 11.3 11.2 10.7 9.3 8.2 4.0
Idaho 13.0 12.3 12.3 12.2 14.1 10.9 7.4
Illinois 11.3 9.7 8.3 7.4 6.6 4.7 4.8
Indiana 10.5 10.3 8.7 8.3 7.3 5.4 4.2
Iowa 12.2 11.6 11.8 12.0 11.3 9.9 8.4
Kansas .. 11.5 12.4 11.1 10.4 9.0 8.3 6.2
Kentucky 15.8 15.2 14.4 13.7 12.2 8.1 7.7
Louisiana 12.6 11.9 10.5 9.8 9.9 9.5 6.4
Maine 12.3 11.7 10.6 9.6 9.6 7.1 4.6
Maryland 12.7 11.3 9.7 8.7 7.1 4.2 4.7
Massachusetts 8.5 7.0 3.4 2.8 7.0 6.5 4.0
Michigan 7.5 6.2 7.2 6.9 7.1 3.8b 3.9
Minnesota 10.7 10.4 10.0 9.1 7.8 4.6 1.9
Mississippi 12.0 12.4 13.9 12.2 8.7 5.2 4.5
Missouri 12.0 11.3 10.6 10.4 9.2 7.9 7.1
5. INTERSTATE CONFERENCE OF ElPLOYIENT SEcuRTrrY AGENcIES, supra note 4, at
8-10; U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, supra note 4, at 6.
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State 1945 1946 1949 1950 1954 1958a 1962
Montana 14.7 14.2 13.4 12.9 15.0 11.7 6.6
Nebraska 10.3 10.3 9.6 9.3 8.3 6.8 5.9
Nevada 16.4 13.5 14.3 12.4 8.9 7.2 5.3
New Hampshire 12.2 10.9 8.3 6.9 5.9 6.0 5.7
New Jersey 16.9 15.6 13.6 12.5 11.7 8.2 6.5
New Mexico 10.2 9.4 10.2 10.2 11.1 9.7 7.7
New York 12.0 10.6 8.3 8.2 10.1 7.8 7.1
North Carolina 13.8 12.5 12.6 11.6 10.4 8.2 7.4
North Dakota 10.9 9.5 9.1 8.6 8.0 5.2 3.4
Ohio 11.4 11.1 10.2 9.2 9.1 5.9 1.7
Oklahoma 9.7 8.7 7.4 6.9 6.2 4.5 3.3
Oregon 11.5 10.9 10.3 8.8 6.5 2.4 4.0
Pennsylvania 11.6 10.3 8.3 7.4 5.0 1.5 1.8
Rhode Island 17.0 16.5 4.9 4.2 3.8 3.9 5.3
South Carolina 11.3 9.9 8.3 7.6 8.3 7.5 6.3
South Dakota 10.9 9.3 8.4 8.6 9.6 8.3 6.6
Tennessee 10.4 11.3 9.8 8.8 7.3 4.6 3.5
Texas 8.5 8.1 8.2 7.9 7.6 5.6 4.6
Utah 14.9 13.9 11.3 10.3 9.7 8.3 6.8
Vermont 12.7 12.0 11.4 10.2 10.1 8.0 4.6
Virginia 9.2 8.6 7.7 7.2 6.5 4.6 5.2
Washington 13.4 12.7 11.5 11.7 11.7 11.1 10.0
West Virginia 10.2 9.3 9.5 8.6 7.3 4.1 4.3
Wisconsin 13.7 13.6 12.4 11.8 11.5 9.6 7.8
Wyoming 10.5 10.1 9.5 9.5 10.4 8.7 3.0
a Based on taxable wages for 12 months ended June 30, 1958.
b Includes funds borrowed from Federal unemployment account.
It will be noted that by 1962 there were three states which had
reserves amounting to less than 2 per cent of their taxable wages. All
three, on the other hand, had reserve ratios in excess of 10 per cent of
taxable wages in 1945. Eight other states had reserves of less than
4 per cent of taxable wages in 1962. The rate of decline in individual
state reserves varied substantially. Those which suffered most severely
from the impact of unemployment, especially during recession years,
drew down their reserves very sharply. Others with relatively low
unemployment rates had much smaller drains on reserves.
More than any other factor, it was the recessions which occurred
during the post war period which pointed up the inadequacies of
benefit financing in a number of states. As early as the 1949 recession
when Rhode Island paid benefits at the then unprecedented rate of
6.2 per cent of taxable payrolls, and in 1954 when Alaska exceeded
this record by paying benefits at a rate of 6.5 per cent, concern arose
over the adequacy of state financing.6 In fact, this concern was great
6. As illustrative of this concern, the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in
1955 recommended "that consideration be given by Congress to authorizing the ap-
plication of sanctions in time to prevent insolvency of a state fund" and expressed its
belief "that the states should -be-required-to- maintain an unemployment tar structure
likely to assure solvency of state funds." COMIUSSION ON INTERCOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, REPORT TO THE PnESIDENT 209 (1955).
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enough to lead to the passage of the Reed Act which provided for
loan funds to states caught with depleted reserves. By 1958 the
situation had worsened considerably. One state (Alaska) was already
insolvent and was able to maintain benefit payments only because
of loans from the federal government under the Reed Act. Five more
states (Delaware, Michigan, Oregon, Pennsylvania and West Vir-
ginia) so depleted their reserves as to become eligible for Reed Act
loans between March 1958 and April 1959. Three of these states
(Michigan, Oregon and Pennsylvania) actually requested and received
loans.
It is pertinent to relate long-range cost and tax rates of the states
whose reserves become so depleted as to qualify them for loans.
TABLE 3
Average Cost and Tax Rates,
U.S. and Selected States
Ave. Ann. Ave. Ann. Ave. Ann. Ave. Ann. Ave. Ann. Ave. Ann.
Cost Rate Tax Rate Cost Rate Tax Rate Cost Rate Tax RateState 1949-1958 1949-1958 1954-1958 1954-1958 1958-1962 1958-1962
U.S. 1.6 1.3 1.9 1.3 2.48 1.89
Alaska 3.6 2.5 4.4 2.7 3.34 3.21
Delaware .9 .6 1.2 .6 2.03 1.83
Michigan 2.1 1.6 3.1 1.6 3.53 2.71
Oregon 2.2 1.5 2.5 1.6 2.47 2.61
Pennsylvania 2.1 1.4 2.9 1.7 3.63 2.80
West Virginia 1.9 1.1 2.3 1.1 2.82 2.23
Clearly, all of these states consistently levied taxes at an average
rate below their average cost rate. While this is true for the system
as a whole, the discrepancy is much more pronounced in these six
states.
It is noteworthy also that since 1958, although average tax rates
have risen considerably in all six states, only in the case of Oregon
did they exceed the average cost rate for the period 1958-62. The
Committee on Benefit Financing in 1959 feared that "in the absence
of appropriate state or federal action, the next recession ... is likely
to cause critical fund shortages in one-fifth to one-fourth of the states
with presently low reserves and with an established practice of levy-
ing employer taxes at low average rates relative to their benefit costs." 8
The recession of 1960-61 caused another heavy drain on reserves and
several states were in a very precarious position for months; only the
upturn in the business cycle saved them from insolvency. There has
been some improvement since then, but for the most part, the fear
7. Employment Security Administrative Financing Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 668 (1954).




expressed above concerning critical fund shortages in some states is
still appropriate.
Before examining proposals for improving the benefit financing
structure of the system, a brief summary will be presented of the
underlying factors which brought about its underfinancing.
IV. FAcToRs CAUSING UNDERFINANCING
The first and foremost factor in causing underfinancing is the
consistent decline in tax rates in the face of increasing potential
liability against the funds. This decline was made possible by the
differentiated rates permitted by experience rating. Low unemploy-
ment costs in the early 1940's combined with this system soon caused
sharp declines in the tax rates. Once reduced, it was very difficult
to increase them even though prudence and good fiscal management
dictated such action. Frequently, the benefit formula was liberalized,
thus increasing potential liability at the same time that taxes were
reduced. Hence, all interested parties were pleased except those
directly concerned with the depletion of the funds. Obviously a sharp
upward revision of all tax rates has been needed by many states for
nearly a decade in order to offset further reserve shrinkage and
steadily increasing potential liability. In some cases it was thought
that increasing the maximum tax rate in a given state schedule would
provide the needed funds, but the fallacy of this move was soon
apparent; the amount of taxable payroll subject to the increased rate
was too small to yield appreciable returns. It is true that a number
of states had provisions for suspending reduced rates when reserves
reached a specified level. However, these safeguards were not reliable.
Some were obsolete-using a fixed dollar balance as a safe reserve
level,9 others geared tax rates to fictitious reserves which failed to
produce adequate tax schedules, often safeguards were disregarded
and bad timing was evident in their operation. Undoubtedly an
important consideration influencing low tax rates and making it
difficult to increase them has been the state competition for new
industry.
A second factor has been the deterioration of experience rating. A
majority of states have a formula for variable rates which bases an




in which C represents the contributions or taxes the employer has
9. This is, of course, unrealistic in view of the steady inflation of earnings and prices,
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paid. B the benefits charged to his account, Tw his taxable payroll
and R his reserve ratio. The higher his reserve ratio, the lower his
tax will be. The theory supporting this formula is that the employer
should pay a tax rate which varies with the unemployment for which
he is responsible. As time passed, a practice known as non-charging
developed which exempted an employer's account from charges in
cases where his former employees quit their jobs or were discharged
for misconduct. Other cases of non-charging involved such items as
payment of dependents' allowances, benefits to pensioners and claim-
ants taking job training. The sum of these non-charges ran as high
as 40 per cent in the case of some states. As a result, employers in
such cases had much higher reserve ratios (fictitious reserves) than
if such payments had been charged to their account. Hence, it is
obvious that the sum of individual employer balances could far exceed
the actual reserves available for benefits.' 0 The practice of non-
charging obviously resulted in a leakage from reserves, there being
no corresponding tax offset, and the development of tax schedules
which could not support benefit outlays."
A third factor which has seriously crippled the efforts of the states
to improve financing has been the fixed tax base. As mentioned
previously, the unemployment insurance taxes have been limited
to the first three thousand dollars of earnings per worker per year
under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act.'12 In 1940, the aggregate
taxable wages of the system represented 93 per cent of total wages
paid to covered workers, by 1949 the proportion had fallen to 81
per cent, to 72 per cent by 1953 and to 59 per cent by 1962. This
ever-widening spread between total earnings and taxable earnings
was caused by the inflation of wage rates and earnings. The rapid
and sharp increases in wages were reflected in similar increases in
benefits, but corresponding increases in tax collections were inhibited
by the limit on the tax base. This weakness in financing benefits
could have been overcome by sharp increases in tax rate schedules,
but as we have seen, this did not occur. An increase in the taxable
10. For example, Tennessee employers as of the end of the year 1962 had net
fictitious reserves aggregating $126.5 million, whereas, the trust fund balance was
$66.4 million.
11. Another type of leakage relates to benefits ineffectively charged. Benefits charged
to employers' accounts with negative balances and who were already paying the
maximum tax rate were ineffective since they could not cause any increase in the tax
rate.
12. This is still true. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 3306(b)(1). Note however, that
Congress has raised the tax base under OASDI from its original $3,000 to $4,800,
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 3121, and bills are now in Congress to increase it to $5,200.
E.g., H.R. 3087, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
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wage base has long been regarded as one of the best methods to
provide sounder financing of the program.
3
A fourth factor depleting reserves has been the constant and extra-
ordinary increase in potential liability against the funds of the
system arising from such developments as the expansion of the
insured labor force, the great inflation of wages and earnings, the
liberalization of benefit formulas and higher levels of unemployment
in recent years.
Another factor of considerable significance relates to the benefit
formula. With the rapid rise in wages and prices, eligibility require-
ments for benefits in many states became obsolete, allowing claimants
to qualify with very limited periods of work in a year. Changes in the
composition of the labor force in the last two decades accentuated
this weakness in the formula. These changes were the great increases
in the number and proportion of part-time, part-year and casual
workers with loose attachment to the labor force. Because of low
eligibility requirements they have been able to qualify for unemploy-
ment insurance benefits for a duration period often in excess of the
number of weeks they had been previously employed.
Along with this, there has been a tendency to stretch the benefit
formula to cover long-term unemployment by providing for temporary
extension of benefits during recessions. 14 This has often resulted in
payments to persons not in the labor market who have already
exhausted a full round of benefits.
These two developments call for a re-examination of the benefit
formulas in some states to assure that a larger share of benefits are
paid to workers who do have a substantial labor market attachment.
Temporary extensions of benefits by the states beyond the regular
duration period set in the law may well impinge upon the insurance
principle involved in this program. It is time to recognize the fact
that unemployment insurance is not a cure-all for all types of un-
employment, especially chronic long-term unemployment. Many new
kinds of programs will be needed to cope with the particularized kinds
of unemployment which have developed with the progress of auto-
mation and other recent changes in our economy.
13. Fourteen states have acted to increase their own tax base to a higher figure.
The federal credit applies only to the first $3,000 of wages earned in a year, hence,
any state tax on wages in excess of this limit is not eligible for federal offset. For a
detailed discussion of this problem see, INTERSTATE CONFERENCE OF EMPLOYMENT
SEcuRi AGENcIES, supra note 4, at 30-34; LEsTER, THE ECONOMICS OF UNEMPLOY-
NmNr COMPENSATION 73-78 (1962).
14. Seven states have provided for state extension of benefits, that is, financed wholly
by the state in each case. These programs allow for 50 per cent increases in benefits
and are triggered into effect by a downswing in the economy within the state. See,
U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, B.E.S. UI SElvicE, Comparison 7 n.5.
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V. PRoPosALs To ImPRovE THE FnANCING OF BENEFITS
The federal-state system of unemployment insurance has served the
country well as a major source of aid to the unemployed and as a
stabilizer of the economy. The weaknesses in benefit financing which
have been pointed out suggest, however, the immediate need of
improvements in the financing structure of the program. Some critics
have proposed that because of these weaknesses, the system should be
federalized with a single unemployment insurance reserve fund,
instead of the 50 state reserve funds, and with uniform tax and
benefit structures applicable throughout the country. This is un-
doubtedly politically impossible, but it is significant that Presidents
Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson all suggested "permanent im-
provements" be made in this system, mostly by way of liberalizing
benefits.15 This cannot be done in some states without extensive
improvements in financing such benefits. There is, of course, a strong
federal interest in this program and the development of insolvency
in several or more states would greatly increase the pressure for
federalization.
So far, federal action to improve this situation is limited. There
are no federal standards for financing benefits nor are there any
standards in respect to benefit amounts and duration. The only
federal action in this respect has been the provision for loans to
states whose reserves had declined to critical levels. It is worthy of
note that the loans which were made in 1958 exhausted the funds
available for this purpose.'
6
15. The McCarthy-King Bill, H.R. 6339, S. 1542, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963),
now before Congress provides for a number of changes in the unemployment insurance
system, including an increase in the federal tax base from $3,000 to $5,200, equalization
grants to states with high benefit costs, higher weekly benefit amounts, federally
extended benefits to the long-term unemployed and an additional federal tax on
employers of 0.3 per cent of taxable payrolls.
16. The Social Security Amendments of 1960, § 523, 74 Stat. 980 (1960), amend-
ing INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3301, increased the Federal Unemployment Tax from
3.0 per cent to 3.1 per cent. This higher rate became effective January 1, 1961. For
tax offset purposes the rate of the tax is still 3.0 per cent making the federal portion
of the tax on employers 0.4 per cent on taxable wages instead of 0.3 per cent. INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3302(d)(1). The purpose of this increase was to finance in-
creasing administrative expenses and to provide revenue in excess of those expenses
for the purpose of building up a larger fund for making loans to states with depleted
reserves. In addition to the 0.4 per cent tax special taxes were levied for the years
1962 and 1963 of 0.4 per cent for the first year and 0.25 per cent for the second year
to cover the costs of the federally extended benefits in all states under the Temporary
Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1961, § 14, 75 Stat. 16 (1961), amend-
ing INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 3301. Also the seventeen states that borrowed funds
from the federal government under The Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act
§ 104, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 3302(c), to pay extended benefits will have to
pay back these loans at a rate of 0.3 per cent of taxable payrolls. Employers in states




Improvements in this program do not require outright federaliza-
tion. Steps can be taken to provide for sounder financing and more
adequate benefit formulas without resort to this extreme measure.
First of all, as mentioned previously, it is time to reaffirm the principle
under which the unemployment insurance program can serve the
country most effectively. This principle is-that it is an insurance
system to protect workers who are regularly and substantially attached
to the labor market from wage loss for limited periods of time result-
ing from involuntary unemployment. Implicit in this principle is the
recognition that unemployment insurance cannot protect the un-
employed against long-term joblessness, nor afford protection against
the unemployment of youth or other new entrants to the labor market.
Further, it can provide only limited protection to distressed areas and
to the unemployed during periods of recession. This leads to the
conclusion that a number of other programs are needed to cope with
these problems of unemployment. In this connection it is encouraging
to note that Congress has enacted such legislation as the Area Re-
development Act, the Manpower Development and Training Act and
the Vocational Educational Act of 1963. It has also provided for two
extensions of benefits, one on a loan basis to the states (1958) and
one on an outright grant basis (1961). 17
The one step which the federal government could make immedi-
ately to improve the financing of benefits would be to amend the
Federal Unemployment Tax Act to provide for an increase in the
tax base from three thousand dollars to some higher figure-say,
forty-two hundred.18 Since 26 states have automatic provisions in
their laws which will raise the state tax base to any new level enacted
by Congress, they would immediately gain a much sounder financing
position by this increase. States without the automatic provision
would fall in line quickly. Since there is reason to believe that some
states have waited on the federal government to take this action and
others probably find it impossible to make this much-needed improve-
ment without federal help, this would seem to be a most important
action to strengthen the present program.19
17. A federally financed extension of benefits to the long-term unemployed is
proposed in the McCarthy-King Bill, supra note 15. This proposal is an improvement
over the two previous federal extensions of benefits in that payments are confined to
workers with substantial attachment to the labor market. Payment under this proposal
would be financed by the federal government by an additional tax of 0.3 per cent
levied on employers. See note 15 supra.
18. The McCarthy-King Bill would raise this to $5,200. Ibid.
19. The Committee on Benefit Financing of the Interstate Conference of Employ-
ment Security Agencies recommended in 1960 that the wage base be increased through
federal legislation to $3,600 and that the tax rate be increased to 4.0 per cent with
a 90 per cent offset (3.6 per cent standard rate plus 0.4 per cent for administrative
financing and loans). INTERSTATE CONFERENCE ON EMPLOYMENT SECuRITY AGENCIES,
REPORT OF THE COM MrIEE ON BENEFIT FINANCING 19 (April 1960).
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So far as state action is concerned, mention has already been made
of the fact that many of the states have taken definite steps to im-
prove their financing position. But progress is too slow to avert
disaster if another recession should occur in the next two or three
years. Steps which the states might well consider taking as soon as
possible include: (1) an extensive rejuvenation of their tax schedules,
(2) the elimination of non-charges or a provision for offsetting them
by prorating them among all covered employers by means of sup-
plemental tax provisions, (3) an increase in the state tax base
regardless of federal action (which may not occur) and, (4) tight-
ening-up of the benefit formula to provide more meaningful eligibility
requirements in the light of the inflation in wages.
Even with determined efforts such as these on the part of the
individual states towards strengthening their financial position, there
still remain two aspects of this problem which can only be adequately
treated by cooperative action among the states. The first of these
relates to the wide differential which exists among the states in benefit
cost rates. States with a high proportion of heavy industry or
seasonal and casual industries have, as a rule, much higher benefit
costs than those which do not have a concentration of such industries.
Hence, they must levy much higher tax rates to cover this risk. But
this may be difficult to do because of interstate competition.
Proposals have been made, therefore, including one by the Kennedy
Administration to equalize these interstate differentials in benefit
cost rates based upon an assumption of interstate responsibility for a
part of the burden of the high cost states. Under a cost equalization
formula, a state would become eligible for payments from the federal
government with respect to any year in which costs exceeded a certain
designated level which would be uniform for all states, even though
its current costs were below its experienced level.20 Under the
proposed equalization formula embodied in the McCarthy-King Bill,
21
no state could qualify for equalization grants unless it provided
benefits equal to the level of benefit adequacy set forth in this bill.
There will undoubtedly be much political pressure against the adop-
tion of such a plan since some states-those with low benefit cost
rates-will object to paying part of the costs of benefits in high cost
states. Further, there will be vigorous objection to the provision for
minimum benefit standards included in the bill.
20. Under the McCarthy-King Bill, supra note 15, provision is made for equaliza-
tion grants whereby the federal government would underwrite two-thirds of a state's
benefit cost of a year in excess of 2.7 per cent of state taxable wages for that year.
If the national benefit cost rate exceeded 2.7 per cent of taxable wages in a given
year, the federal government would contribute only towards that portion of a state's
cost in excess of the national rate. The cost of this plan would be defrayed out of an




VI. A PROPOSAL FOR REINSURANCE
The second aspect of the problem of financing benefits which
suggests state and federal cooperative effort has reference to the
extraordinary heavy drains on reserves caused by recessions. Sudden,
substantial, and unpredictable losses have occurred in many states
as a result of the recessions of 1949, 1954, 1958 and 1960-61; in some
states decimating reserves. For many years the states have been
able to fall back upon reserves accumulated during World War II,
but now that reserves are virtually depleted in some states, the need
for protection of funds by some cooperative plan among the states is
paramount. The point is that with all the recent efforts by the states
to improve their financing position, it is quite likely that many of
them will be unable to build up their individual reserves sufficiently
to cope with a catastrophic benefit cost year. It takes years to
accumulate a sound reserve level; however, it can in turn be seriously
depleted by recession drains in a single year.
A reinsurance plan would provide a way out of this difficulty.
Reinsurance is quite different from cost equalization. Under a
reinsurance formula, a state would be eligible for reinsurance pay-
ments only to the extent that its costs, however high, were in excess
of its own experienced costs. The distinguishing features of an un-
employment reinsurance program are (1) a base period which repre-
sents a recent and normal benefit cost experience, and (2) a measure
of the severity of cost experience in the current period. In a cost
equalization plan, on the other hand, specified rates of benefit costs
are designated uniformly for all states beyond which costs are shared
in the current period, regardless of past experience.
The principle of reinsurance has long been used in private insur-
ance. All forms of insurance are based upon the law of averages,
that is, that a large number of uncertainties will produce relative
certainty. The theory is that although the loss of a single risk cannot
be foreseen, the total losses on all risks may be predicted with suf-
ficient accuracy to make insurance possible. This implies that all
risks are of the same amount. Actually, they are not. Unusually
large risks may cause catastrophic losses out of proportion to their
number. Private insurance companies customarily set up line limits,
that is, limitations on the retention of risk, and reinsure the excess
of risk over and above such limits. This is often called excess-
of-loss insurance. By this means, private insurance companies assure
themselves of a safe distribution of risk and stability in loss experience.
This principle is applicable to the federal-state unemployment
insurance system. Unemployment is not a homogeneous risk. It
varies greatly in length, extent, from area to area, and in its timing.
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Its very heterogeneity and the possibility that large, unpredictable
losses may occur suddenly, deterred insurance companies from writing
this kind of insurance long before the present governmental system
was established.
The type of unemployment which causes the greatest threat to the
solvency of unemployment insurance funds is mass unemployment
resulting from a downswing in the economy. Then too, the national
economy and many state economies are undergoing rapid and con-
tinuous change. For example, a sudden cancellation of large defense
contracts, the removal or decline of certain industries, or other
economic events may plunge the state into an unprecedented benefit
cost pattern. This is most likely to happen during a strong recession-
ary movement and intensify it. It is also true that some states,
because of their industrial composition respond to nationwide reces-
sions more severely than other states. A mild recession nationally may
be sharply felt in a few states. Also, recessions differ in their causes
and patterns of development. For example, in 1949 a soft-goods reces-
sion developed, whereas in 1958 and 1961, industries manufacturing
hard goods suffered more severely. This implies that states most
adversely affected will not necessarily be the same from recession to
recession and catastrophic declines in reserves may occur in any of
them.
A sound reinsurance formula would then give the states the protec-
tion they need against sudden, large and unforeseen drains on funds
without accumulating excessively large reserves. This is a highly
important point since the states with lowest reserve levels may not
have the time before the next recession to accumulate such funds in
any event.
22
A new approach to the problem of developing a reinsurance formula
which would meet the needs of the states is outlined in the analysis
which follows. This formula is based upon the insured unemployment
rate and has the following features:
1. Trigger points of 6 per cent, 6 1/2 per cent and 7 per cent annual
insured unemployment rates for determining eligibility.
2. Excess loss defined as the excess of benefit costs in the current year
over benefit costs in the previous year.
3. The proportion of excess loss reimbursable to be 25 per cent if the trigger
point is designated as an annual insured unemployment rate of 6 per
cent and over, 37 1/2 per cent if the trigger point is set at an unemploy-
ment rate of 6 1/2 per cent and over, and 50 per cent if the trigger rate
is 7 per cent and over.
22. Borrowing from the loan fund under the Reed Act, 68 Stat. 668 (1954), 42
U.S.C. §§ 1321-23 (1958), would help the states, but these loans have to be repayed.
Also since there is no limit on the cumulation of loans and no solvency standards, there
is a tendency in this arrangement to limit state responsibility to whatever tax effort a
state chooses to consider acceptable.
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If all three trigger points are used simultaneously on a sliding scale basis,
then a reimbursable grant of 25 per cent of the excess loss would be
made to a state with an annual insured unemployment rate of 6 per cent
but less than 6 1/2 per cent, 37 1/2 per cent to a state with an unem-
ployment rate of 6 1/2 but less than 7 per cent and 50 per cent to a state
with an unemployment rate of 7 per cent and over.
These three factors may be summarized as follows: The annual
rate of insured unemployment for any state is derived by the expres-
sion u in which u is the total number of continued weeks of
52E
unemployment claimed during the year and E is the monthly average
covered employment. If the value of this expression is equal to or
greater than the trigger point, a state would be eligible for a reim-
bursable grant provided it had excess costs during the year. If a
state met these two requirements it would be reimbursed as indicated
above. The provisions for reimbursement may be summarized as
follows:
(a) With a trigger point of 6 per cent and over,
RG = .25(B-Bo)
(b) With a trigger point of 6 1/2 per cent and over,
RG = .375(B-Bo)
(c) With a trigger point of 7 per cent and over,
RG = .50(B-Bo)
(d) Using all three trigger points simultaneously on a sliding scale basis,
the proportion of excess loss reimbursable to a state would be
either 25, 37 1/2 or 50 per cent depending on its unemployment
rate as explained previously.
In the expressions above RG equals the amount of reimbursable
grant, B equals the dollar amount of benefit expenditures during the
current year and Bo equals the dollar amount of benefit expenditures
during previous year.
Each of these features will be discussed with examples of how the
formula would have worked had it been in effect in recent years and
a number of subsidiary points will be considered.
A good case can be made for using the rate of insured unemploy-
ment as the criterion for eligibility23 Excess costs are directly
correlated with high rates of unemployment. Hence it is logical to
set some rate or rates of insured unemployment as the trigger points.
The question is, what rate or rates should be used? Professor Lester
23. This approach was suggested by Professor Lester although his proposal varies
considerably from that recommended here. See L~s-aE, TAE ECONONiCS OF UN-
EMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 128 (1962).
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proposed a single rate which has appeal in its simplicity. However,
the difference between qualifying and not qualifying can be so great
in dollar terms that it is hard to justify a single trigger point for
determining eligibility. An element of flexibility is called for which
would provide a range over which a state could become eligible for
differing degrees of cost reimbursement. This is provided in the
sliding scale arrangement described above which would give the
states the greatest protection. The principle followed in the formula-
tion of the proposed reinsurance plan is that of increasing protection
as financing difficulty increases.
As to the method of determining the amount of excess costs, it
should be emphasized that we are concerned with temporary increases
in costs, which most frequently occur during cyclical declines. These
costs arise suddenly, and the bulk of them occur during the early
stages of a recession. The difference between the benefit outlay for a
recession year and that for the year immediately preceding it is a
good measure of the impact of the recession on benefit outlay.
Finally, there is the question as to what proportion of a state's
excess costs should be reimbursed. It could be a flat percentage for
all states, whatever their qualifying unemployment rate. The analysis
here, however, has followed the principle that the higher the trigger
point the larger should be the proportion of excess costs for which a
state should be reimbursed. It is not proposed, however, that rein-
surance should ever bear more than half the burden of excess loss.
In other words, a state would be expected to finance a substantial part
of its excess costs out of its own funds. This, of course, implies an
element of coinsurance. This has the effect of at once conserving re-
insurance funds and preventing abuse of the system through benefit
formula liberalizations.
VII. TESTING AND EVALUATING THE PROPOSED FORMULA
The proposed formula and certain possible modifications of it were
tested against past state experience. The results indicated that the
proposed formula is most effective in pinpointing excess costs in the
early stages of a recession and in providing timely and significant aid
to the states.
Computations were made using each of the three suggested trigger
rates of insured unemployment (6, 6.5 and 7 per cent), and the three
associated rates of reimbursement. Computations were also made
using all three rates simultaneously on a sliding scale basis. The
results for the period 1947 through 1961 are shown in Tables 4 and
5 and are reviewed briefly below:
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(a) Using a trigger point of 6% and grant of 25% of excess, costs:
No states qualified for grants for the years 1947, 1955, 1956, or 1959.
Eighteen states qualified for grants in 1949, 15 in 1954, 6 in 1957, 25 in
1958, 6 in 1960, and 21 in 1961. On the other hand, only 2 states qualified
in 1948 and 1950 and one in each of the three years 1951, 1952 and 1953.
The total excess loss over the whole period 1947-1961 amounted to
$2.75 billion, of which 689 million dollars would have been reimbursable
under a 25% grant.
(b) A trigger point of 6.5% and grant of 37.5%:
No states were qualified for grants in 1947, 1948, 1955, or 1959.
Fourteen states qualified for grants in 1949, 14 in 1954, 4 in 1957,
21 in 1958, 5 in 1960, and 13 in 1961. On the other hand, only 2 states
qualified for grants in 1950 and 1 each in 1951, 1952 and 1953.
The total amount of excess loss for the period 1947-1961 was $2.2
billion; the total amount reimbursable under a 37.5% grant was $831 million.
(c) A trigger point of 7% and grant of 50%:
No states qualified for grants in 1947, 1948, 1952, 1955, 1956, or 1959.
Eleven states were eligible in 1949, 11 in 1954, 17 in 1958, and 10 in 1961.
Three states were eligible in 1957, 2 in 1960 and 1 each in 1950, 1951 and
1953.
The total amount of excess loss was 1.5 billion dollars; the total
amount reimbursable under a 50 per cent grant was 762 million dollars.
(d) Using all 3 trigger points on sliding scale base:
The number eligible is the same as under a 6% rate.
The total amount of excess loss is 2.75 billion dollars (the same as
under the 6% rate), the total amount reimbursable, however, is 1.15 billion
dollars.
Table 6 shows the amount of reimbursable grants under each trigger
point and associated reimbursement rate for six recession years.
TABLE 6
Number of States Eligible in Six Recession
Years and Amount of Reimbursable Grants
Under Insured Unemployment Rates of
6%, 6.5%, 7% and Sliding Scale
Number of States Eligible Under Amount of Reimbursable Grants Under
Sliding Sliding
6% 6.5% 7% Scale 6% 6.5% 7% Scale
(Millions)
1949 18 14 11 18 $133 $192 $225 $253
1954 15 14 11 15 99 143 127 178
1957 6 4 3 6 9 10 7 14
1958 25 21 17 25 343 407 318 558
1960 6 5 2 6 6 8 3 9
1961 21 13 10 21 92 69 82 135
TOTAL $682 $829 $762 $1,147
An important feature of the formula is disclosed when the total
amounts reimbursable during the recession years 1949, 1954, 1958, and
1960-61 are compared with the total amounts reimbursable for all
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years during the period 1947-1961. This comparison is made in Table
7 and shows that regardless of the insured unemployment rate classifi-
cation, the total amount reimbursable in the recession years amounted
to 99 per cent or more of the total amount reimbursable for all years
(1947-1961).
TABLE 7
Cumulative Totals of Grants Under Four Rate Classifications for All Years
During Period 1947-1961 and for Recession Years
Insured Unemployment All Years Recession Years
Rate (In Millions)
6 percent $ 689 $ 682
6.5 831 829
7.0 " 762 759
Sliding Scale 1,156 1,147
Data are presented in Table 8 which indicate the cumulative
amounts of reimbursable grants for the period 1947-1961 state-by-
state for all states entitled to total grants of five million dollars or
more. The states are arrayed in order of the size of the total grants
to which each would be entitled under a 6 per cent insured unemploy-
ment rate. The data are presented, however, for all states in the
table under all four rates-6, 6.5, 7 per cent and sliding scale.
TABLE 8
Cumulative Amounts Reimbursable for Period 1947-1961
Under Insured Unemployment Rates of: *
(Millions) Sliding
6% 6.5% 7% Scale
New York $106.6 $159.9 $ 86.2 $181.5
Pennsylvania 106.5 159.7 212.0 212.8
California 97.4 39.9 53.3 124.0
Michigan 90.8 136.2 127.4 168.0
Ohio 62.0 71.1 0 85.7
New Jersey 30.2 38.5 31.5 51.0
Massachusetts 28.5 24.4 32.6 44.8
Connecticut 23.6 35.4 47.2 47.2
Kentucky 16.5 24.8 25.6 31.1
Washington 15.6 23.4 20.1 28.5
West Virginia 15.5 18.7 24.9 28.0
Tennessee 15.2 20.4 23.0 27.7
Oregon 12.4 18.5 12.9 21.8
Rhode Island 11.7 14.7 19.6 21.5
Indiana 10.9 0 0 10.9
Alabama 10.3 14.3 9.1 17.3
North Carolina 8.0 0 0 8.0
Maine 5.4 8.1 10.8 10.8
* States arrayed according to size of reimbursable amount under a 6% rate. No state
included having a reimbursable amount of less than $5 million.
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VIII. COST OF TnE PROPOSED FoRMuLA
The cost of the proposed sliding scale formula for the entire period
1947-1961 would have been 1,156,402,000 dollars or 0.08 per cent of
the 1,477,684,779,000 dollars in taxable wages for the same period. -
Without the sliding scale feature, a 7 per cent trigger point with
50 per cent reimbursement would have cost 762,097,000 dollars, or
0.05 per cent of taxable wages. The 6.5 per cent trigger point with
37.5 per cent reimbursement would have cost 830,694,000 dollars, or
0.06 per cent of taxable wages. The 6 per cent trigger point with 25
per cent reimbursement would have cost 688,978,000 dollars or 0.05
per cent of taxable payrolls.
IX. MEASURING "NoRMAL COSTS" FOLLOWING A RECESSION YEAR
There have been questions as to the possibility of reimbursing some
portion of benefit costs solely on the basis of a high rate of unemploy-
ment, even though there are no excess losses as determined by the
formula. This question introduces a completely different set of con-
siderations which relate to cost equalization rather than reinsurance.
If the device which triggers grants is to be solely the unemployment
rate, the concepts of "normal costs" and "base period," which are
essential to a reinsurance formula, will completely disappear. The
formula then becomes in part a cost equalization device. As a cost
equalization device, it is too severe. As a reinsurance formula, it is
lacking in safeguards against abuse, since a reinsurance formula must
bear some relation to normal costs and must be set up in such a way
as to avoid reimbursing them.
If a state experiences a qualifying rate of insured unemployment,
but has no excess loss, it either (a) experienced high normal costs in
the preceding year, in which case no reinsurance payment is justified,
or (b) experienced abnormally high cost in the preceding year, in
which case a reinsurance payment was probably paid for the preced-
ing year. In case of (b), if a reinsurance grant was not made for
the preceding year, it is to be suspected that a high normal cost
pattern prevails. Again, no reinsurance payment for the current year
is indicated. But, in the case of two successive years of qualifying
rates, it may be desirable to extend the protection of the formula to
the second year of recession. This could be done by providing that
where a state has had excess costs as defined in the formula in a
given year, then it could qualify for reimbursement for a second
successive year based upon the difference in its costs for the second
year and its costs for the year immediately preceding the first year
in which it had excess costs. For example, if T is the base year,
T + 1 the first recession year, and T + 2 the second recession year,
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then if a state is eligible in T + 1 and has an eligible rate of insured
unemployment in T + 2 but has no excess loss as measured against
T + 1, then an alternative base period, T, might be used. This
change in the formula would cost slightly more but it would meet
much more effectively the needs of states where the progress of
recovery was slow.
A significant question at this point is how many states met the
trigger point of 6 per cent or more, but failed to have excess costs
as measured by the preceding year? Table 9 gives this information.
TABLE 9
Number of States With a Trigger Point of 6 Per cent
or Higher Insured Unemployment but Lacking Excess Costs
















It should be noted that states that failed to qualify because of lack
of excess costs, did so in the year immediately following a recession
year, namely, 1950, 1955, and 1959. The alternative base period
discussed above is obviously a suitable modification of the formula in
view of these facts.
X. RESERVE FUND LEVEL AS AN ELIGIBILrrY CRITERION
It has been suggested that it be made a condition for receiving
reinsurance grants that the reserve fund of the recipient state be
below some agreed-upon level with respect to liabilities, the purpose
being to conserve reinsurance funds and benefit only those states
which are in need. There are a number of reasons why this ought
to be opposed. One is that there exists no agreed-upon device for
measuring fund adequacy, and there is no hope of formulating a
measure which would produce uniform results in all states. Another
reason is that such a program of reinsurance might encourage some
states to rely on minimal financing efforts. This would surely be the
case unless minimum financing standards were enforced.
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XI. SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ABUSE
A note of caution is validly sounded by many persons who want to
know what safeguards there are in the proposed formula to prevent
a state's liberalizing its benefits at the expense of the reinsurance
program. The existence of a base period for determining "normal"
costs is the safeguard. In the first place, the cost of liberalizing a
benefit formula will become "normal cost" within a very short period
(not longer than two years) under the proposed reinsurance formula.
This means that the period of time to which this question relates is
very short and the likelihood of its affecting the reinsurance program
is correspondingly slight. In the second place, the higher benefit
costs will become partly reimbursable only when high unemployment
rates are experienced. This precludes deliberate abuse. On the other
hand, reinsurance is needed to assist a state which may have enacted
liberalizations at an inauspicious time with reference to financing.
And, in the third place, a state would in any event have to meet at
least half the burden of higher costs from its own fund.
XII. REn SUBANCE AND EXTENDED BENEFITS
There is also the problem of state-financed extended benefit pro-
grams. Should reinsurance cover these benefits in whole or in part,
or not at all? In replying to this question it is necessary to dis-
tinguish carefully between extensions of benefits through liberaliza-
tions of regular state benefit formulas and the extension of benefits
under recession-triggered special programs. In the former case, full
reinsurance coverage should apply for reasons discussed above. In
the latter case, there are two principal reasons why extended benefits
should be wholly excluded from reinsurance protection. One reason
is that since extended benefits and reinsurance eligibility would be
triggered-in almost concomitantly, there would be no cost experience
in the base period to compare with that in the current period. In
short, there is no measure of "normar' costs and all extended benefit
outlays would become "excess loss." The reinsurance fund is thus
abused by being made the vehicle for financing part of a state's
benefit extension program. A second and related reason is that the
enactment of programs of benefit extension is discretionary and they
should not be undertaken unless they can be adequately financed
out of state funds. Also, it is exceedingly unlikely that any reinsurance
plan will be adopted prior to the initiation of a nationwide program
of regular extended benefits, the financing of which will probably
be from a revision of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act.2 It is not
24. INT. RE v. CODE OF 1954 §§ 3301-08. Note provision for this in the McCarthy-
King Bill, supra notes 15 & 17.
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needful, therefore, that the application of reinsurance to other than
regular state benefits should be considered.
XIII. How SHOULD REiNsuRANcE BE FINANCED?
There is a strong argument for federal financing of reinsurance.
The risk involved in reinsurance is related to recession, or mass
unemployment. It is a risk which is unpredictable, may develop very
suddenly, and may cause heavy drains on state reserves. Furthermore,
it is nationwide in scope and wholly outside the control of any
employer or state.
It is obvious that there is a very important national interest in the
alleviation of the burden of recession unemployment. This has been
manifested many times by Congressional legislation. The logic of the
situation points to the need for federal cooperation in the case of
this proposal.
It is recommended, therefore, that funds adequate to finance a
reinsurance system be provided by a uniform federal tax levied on
all state taxable payrolls and that funds collected by this tax be
accumulated in a special fund designated as the Reinsurance Fund.
Grants would be made to the states by the federal government as
they become eligible.
It would seem that a plan such as this has decided advantages over
cost equalization. First, every state could benefit from this plan since
all are exposed to the risk of heavy drains in recession periods.
Second, no state would be called upon to share in the costs of those
states which have normally high and persistent benefit cost rates.
Third, there should be much less political opposition to this plan
than exists towards cost equalization since this proposal simply in-
volves paying an insurance premium of low cost to protect against
an unusual and unpredictable hazard. Finally, this proposal does not
involve any requirement relating to benefit standards.
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